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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Timothy Dean Livingston appeals from the denial of his successive Rule 
35 motions. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal were found by the 
district court as follows: 
On 09/17/2012 the defendant, TIMOTHY DEAN LIVINGSTON, was 
sentenced in CR-2012-2078, on one count of Misappropriation of 
Personal Identifying Information.  The court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with three years fixed and two years 
indeterminate.  However, that sentence was suspended and the 
defendant was placed on probation for a period of three-and-a-half 
(3.5) years.  Livingston was later found in violation of probation and 
the original sentence was re-imposed but that sentence was 
suspended for a four-year probation on 09/18/2015. 
 
On 09/18/2015, the defendant, TIMOTHY DEAN LIVINGSTON, 
was sentenced in CR42-15-7024 on one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, to wit: Morphine.  At sentencing, the court 
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed and 
four years indeterminate to run consecutive to Twin Falls County 
case No. CR-2012-2078.  However, that sentence was suspended 
and the defendant was placed on probation for a period of four 
years. 
 
Probation violation proceedings were initiated in both cases on 
04/21/2016.   On 06/28/2016, both probations were revoked and 
the original sentences were imposed.  However, the sentence in 
CR 42-15-7024 was modified pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) 
to an imposition of a unified sentence of two years, with one year 
fixed, again to run consecutive to CR-2012-2078.  Livingston filed a 
Rule 35 Motion on 07/12/2016, requesting that the court reconsider 
its decision to impose sentence and to reduce the imposed 
sentence. 
 
A hearing was held on 09/06/2016.  The defendant appeared 
telephonically and was represented by his attorney, Ron Bird. The 
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State was represented by Peter Hatch.  The court heard testimony 
from Mary Roman and Nancy Livingston, and took the matter under 
advisement after the hearing. 
 
(R., pp. 432-33; see also pp. 676-77.)   
 The district court concluded it had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the 
Rule 35 motions, but denied the motions on the merits.  (R., pp. 434-37, 678-81.)  
Livingston filed notices of appeal in both cases, timely from the orders denying 
the Rule 35 motions.  (R., pp. 452-54, 687-89.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Livingston states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Livingston’s 
Rule 35 motions, thereby authorizing this Court to consider 
his timely appeals from the orders that denied those 
motions? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying 
Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 motions, in light of the additional 
information he presented? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Did the district court lack jurisdiction to consider Livingston’s successive 
motions for reduction of his sentences? 
 
2. If the district court had jurisdiction, has Livingston failed to show any 
abuse of discretion by the district court for denying his motions seeking 
reduction of his sentences? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Livingston’s Successive 
Motions For Reduction Of His Sentences 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In its order, the district court noted that Livingston, at the disposition 
hearing, requested a reduction of the sentences, which was granted at least in 
part by reducing the sentence for possession of morphine.  (R., p. 436, n. 1, 
p. 680, n. 1;  see R., pp. 656-57 (reducing sentence from five years with one year 
determinate to two years with one year determinate).)  It declined to decide the 
significance of this, however, because “the state did not object to this motion on 
that basis.”   (R., p. 436, n. 1, p. 680, n. 1.)  Livingston, in anticipation of an 
argument from the state on appeal that the district court did not have jurisdiction 
to hear the successive Rule 35 requests, asserts that the district court did have 
jurisdiction to consider the Rule 35 motions.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  Application 
of the relevant law shows that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the successive Rule 35 motions. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”  State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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C. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Livingston’s 
Successive Rule 35 Motions 
 
 Rule 35 provides that “no defendant may file more than one motion 
seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.”  “I.C.R. 35 clearly prohibits the 
filing of more than one motion for a reduction of sentence.  Therefore, the district 
court lack[s] jurisdiction to entertain successive motions under this rule.”  State v. 
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 505, 873 P.2d 144, 150 (1994); see also State v. 
Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 731-32, 52 P.3d 875, 876-77 (Ct. App. 2002) (district 
court lacks jurisdiction to consider “an improper successive motion” under Rule 
35).  A successive Rule 35 motion should be “summarily denied.”  State v. 
Hickman, 119 Idaho 7, 9, 802 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 This case is controlled by State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 854 P.2d 259 
(1993), abrogated on other grounds State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 
(2010).  Knowlton filed a Rule 35 motion after the district court revoked his 
probation, ordered his sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.  The district 
court denied the motion, but reinstated Knowlton’s probation.  Id. at 918, 
854 P.2d at 261.  About three years later Knowlton was again found in violation 
of his probation and the district court revoked probation and ordered his sentence 
executed.  Id.  Knowlton moved for leniency, but the court denied the request 
without letting Knowlton present any evidence or argument.  Id.  In rejecting 
Knowlton’s claim that the district court erred by denying him the opportunity to 
present evidence or argument in support of his motion, the Idaho Supreme Court 
quoted Rule 35, with emphasis on the portion allowing only one motion, and 
stated: 
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Knowlton previously filed a Rule 35 motion in 1986 after the trial 
court imposed the indeterminate ten-year sentence. At the hearing 
on March 6, 1987, the trial court denied this motion. Knowlton was 
not entitled to file another Rule 35 motion and the trial court’s 
comments at the probation revocation hearing that it would not 
reduce Knowlton’s sentence pursuant to Rule 35 were proper. 
 
Id. at 922, 854 P.2d at 265.  See also State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 439, 
258 P.3d 950, 959 (Ct. App. 2011) (“we have consistently held that Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 precludes the ‘filing’ of a second motion for reduction of 
sentence”). 
 At the probation violation disposition hearing Livingston asked the district 
court to “consider restructuring the sentences” so he would not have to serve the 
full four years of the sentences as then constituted.  (Tr., p. 28, L. 11 – p. 30, 
L. 14.)  The district court granted the motion at least partially and reduced the 
possession of morphine sentence from five years with one year determinate to 
two years with one year determinate.  (Tr., p. 44, L. 8 - p. 45, L. 9.)  Because 
Livingston was not entitled to file the successive Rule 35 motions requesting 
reduction of his sentences, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider their 
merits.  Hurst, 151 Idaho at 439, 258 P.3d at 959. 
 Livingston makes several arguments as to why the district court had 
jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-13.)  Review shows these arguments lack 
merit. 
 Livingston first argues that “his request for leniency at the disposition 
hearing was not a motion subject to Rule 35’s one-motion limitation.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  He argues that after revoking probation a court 
“determines a new sentence,” and thus a recommendation to reduce the prior 
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sentence is not a Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (emphasis original).)  
This statement of the law is false.   
“When the trial court has sentenced the defendant and has suspended 
execution of the sentence and placed the defendant on probation, upon 
revocation of the probation the court cannot resentence the defendant.”  State v. 
Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594, 199 P.3d 769, 771 (2008).  To the contrary, “‘the 
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according 
to law.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 19-2603).  The question faced by 
the court upon revoking probation where a prison sentence has been 
pronounced but was suspended is “‘should that sentence be ordered into 
execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as authorized by I.C.R. 
35?’”  State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (2001) (quoting 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The 
cases cited by Livingston are not to the contrary, and in fact also make clear that 
any reduction of a previously imposed but suspended sentence upon revocation 
of probation is accomplished by application of Rule 35.  State v. Clontz, 
156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 P.3d 529, 534 (Ct. App. 2014) (cited Appellant’s brief, 
p. 8) (“Clontz claims the district court erred by failing to sua sponte reduce his 
sentence pursuant to its discretionary authority under Rule 35. Thus, Clontz’s 
claim is based upon a rule violation, not upon a violation of one of his 
constitutional rights.”); State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 
(Ct. App. 2009) (cited Appellant’s brief, p. 8) (“After a probation violation has 
been established, the court may order that the suspended sentence be executed 
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or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to 
reduce the sentence.”). 
The only time when a new sentence is imposed after a probation violation 
is if the court initially withheld judgment: 
If the court grants a withheld judgment to a particular defendant and 
places that defendant on probation, jurisdiction is retained by the 
district court during the period of probation and the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify the conditions of the defendant’s 
probation. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 460, 808 P.2d 373, 379 
(1991) (citations omitted). If those conditions are violated, the 
district court may revoke the defendant’s probation and thereafter 
“impose any sentence which originally might have been imposed at 
the time of conviction.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing [State v.] 
Pedraza, 101 Idaho [449,] 442, 614 P.2d [980,] 982 [(1980)] 
interpreting I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-222). If a defendant’s probation is 
revoked following a court’s suspension of execution of the 
sentence, however, the district court may only “cause the sentence 
imposed to be executed.” 
 
State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792–93, 919 P.2d 319, 321–22 (1996) 
(emphasis original).  Here the district court imposed suspended sentences, and 
did not withhold judgment.  (R., pp. 95-101, 565-71.)  Thus, as set forth above, 
Livingston was not subject to imposition of a “new” sentence; the district court 
was limited to executing the originally imposed sentences as imposed or 
reducing them pursuant to Rule 35.  Because the only mechanism for reducing 
the sentences was Rule 35, Livingston’s request for a reduction at the disposition 
hearing was a Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
 Livingston next argues that the issues before the court were “whether to 
continue or revoke probation” and “the appropriate sentence to execute” and he 
had “a due process right to be heard on all of these matters, including the 
reduction of his original sentences, and Rule 35’s limitation, therefore, cannot be 
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applied to restrict that right.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9 (emphasis original).)  This 
argument is based on the misapprehension of the Idaho law, as set forth above, 
that the decision to reduce the sentence at the disposition hearing was 
independent of Rule 35.  Livingston has failed to show any due process right 
violated by the prohibition on successive Rule 35 motions. 
 Livingston next argues that Hurst, supra, does not control this case, has 
been modified by a subsequent case, or should be overruled.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-13.)  These arguments do not withstand scrutiny. 
Although Hurst is not the only authority showing that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Livingston’s successive Rule 35 motions, it 
certainly appears dispositive.  Hurst requested a reduction in his previously 
imposed sentence at a jurisdictional review hearing, and the district court granted 
the motion and reduced the sentence.  Hurst, 151 Idaho at 438, 258 P.3d at 958.  
Hurst thereafter filed a written Rule 35 motion, which the district court rejected as 
successive.  Id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, 
concluding the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the successive Rule 35 motion 
and rejecting Hurst’s argument that the Rule prohibits only multiple written Rule 
35 motions while allowing multiple oral Rule 35 motions.  Id. at 438-39, 258 P.3d 
at 958-59.  Application of Hurst shows the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Livingston’s successive written Rule 35 motion, filed after making an 
oral Rule 35 motion at the disposition hearing. 
Livingston first argues that Hurst does not “control” this case because 
“Hurst dealt with a rider review hearing, not a disposition hearing.”  (Appellant’s 
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brief, p. 9.)  This argument is apparently premised on Livingston’s assertion that 
the request to reduce his sentences made at the disposition hearing was not a 
Rule 35 motion.  Because that premise is false, as set forth above, this argument 
is faulty.  The holding and analysis in Hurst applies in this case. 
Livingston next argues that Hurst has been called into question by Clontz, 
supra.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  In Clontz, the issue was whether “a criminal 
defendant may continue to claim on appeal that the district court erred by failing 
to sua sponte reduce the defendant’s sentence upon relinquishment of 
jurisdiction or revocation of probation.”  Clontz, 156 Idaho at 788, 331 P.3d at 
530.  In its analysis, under possible justifications for continuing the rule that such 
an appellate challenge was proper, the Court noted that defendants might be 
“limited in the ability to take up the issue of reduction of sentence at the time of 
relinquishment or revocation because doing so may impair the ability to file an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.”  Id. at 789-90, 331 P.3d at 531-32.  The rule in 
Hurst “may have the consequence of effectively precluding a defendant from 
frank discussion at the relinquishment or revocation proceeding regarding 
reduction of sentence.”  Id. at 790, 331 P.3d at 532.  In a footnote to this 
observation the court noted that “under the rule in Hurst, the defendant may well 
waste any potentially successful Rule 35 motion by raising the issue of reduction 
at relinquishment or revocation.”  Id. at 790 n. 3, 331 P.3d at 532 n. 3.  The Court 
of Appeals ultimately held that a defendant must request a reduction of sentence 
to preserve any claim that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing 
the sentence.  Id. at 790-92, 331 P.3d at 532-34.  Although the court in Clontz 
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certainly discussed the implications of the rule that a defendant who chooses to 
move for a reduction of sentence at a disposition hearing is foreclosed from filing 
a later motion for reduction of sentence, it in no way called that rule into question. 
Livingston finally argues that Hurst should be overruled, and Rule 35 
reinterpreted to allow unlimited oral motions for reduction of sentence.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-13.)  First, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either 
authority or argument are lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 
335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 257, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).  Livingston has failed to cite authority on the legal 
standard for overruling precedent.  Of course the Idaho Supreme Court is not 
bound by principles of stare decisis regarding Court of Appeals decisions.  If this 
case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, however, Livingston has waived any 
argument that Hurst should be overruled.     
 If this case is not assigned to the Court of Appeals, but instead retained or 
reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court, Hurst should be affirmed for the reasons 
stated in that opinion.  Hurst, 151 Idaho at 438-39, 258 P.3d at 958-59.   
The district court noted that Livingston presented an oral motion to reduce 
his sentences at the disposition hearing.  Because of that prior motion, the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the subsequently filed 
successive Rule 35 motion.   
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II. 
Livingston Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion By The District Court 
For Denying His Motion Seeking Reduction Of His Sentences 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 If this Court reaches the merits of the district court’s denial of the Rule 35 
motion, Livingston has failed to show an abuse of discretion.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Denial of a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017); see also State v. 
Thomas, 161 Idaho 898, 899, 392 P.3d 1239, 1240 (Ct. App. 2017) (“A motion 
for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”). 
 
C. Livingston Has Failed To Show That His Sentences Are Excessive 
 
 “In presenting a Rule 35 motion, a defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
district court in support of the motion.”  State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 162, 164, 
384 P.3d 409, 411 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)).  “In conducting our review of the grant or denial of a 
Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used 
for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.”  State v. Anderson, 
No. 41730, 2015 WL 7204541, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015). 
 The district court concluded that the sentences were not excessive when 
pronounced, and that the reduction already ordered showed “ample leniency on 
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the defendant’s behalf.”  (R., pp. 435-36, 679-80.)  The court further determined 
that it had shown leniency by granting many opportunities at probation and an 
opportunity to participate in drug court, but that Livingston has squandered those 
opportunities.  (R., pp. 436, 680.)  Furthermore, the district court had warned 
Livingston that its leniency was exhausted when it granted him his final chance 
on probation.   (R., pp. 436, 680.)    “On the basis of the probation violations, 
including being terminated from drug court, and the need for enforcing this 
court’s pronouncements, including the good order and protection of society, this 
court DENIES the defendant’s Rule 35 motion.”    (R., pp. 436, 680.)   
 Livingston disputes none of the district court’s analysis, reasoning, or 
factual findings.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-17.)  Rather, Livingston contends the 
“evidence of [his] remarkable progress on probation, and the strong support 
shown by his family members,” show his sentences to be excessive.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 17.)  Livingston has failed to demonstrate that his sentences were 
excessive.  If he had in fact made “remarkable progress on probation” he would 
not have been going to prison after multiple violations of the terms of probation.  
Even assuming that his family support was “strong,” it had not prevented the 
commission of two felonies nor been sufficient to prevent multiple probation 
violations.  Livingston has shown no abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 
35 motions.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Livingston’s Rule 35 motions. 
 DATED this 7th day of June, 2017. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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